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IntroductIon
Informal payments refer to cash or in-kind contributions that patients give 
to doctors beyond formal payments in the course of seeking medical ser-
vices in predominantly public health institutions. The practice is endemic 
in many developing countries, and is particularly widespread in former and 
current socialist countries in Asia and Central and Eastern Europe (Lewis 
2010) where informal economies have existed for decades (Morris and 
Polese 2015). Given their nature of secrecy and informality, they are con-
sidered illegal or at least illegitimate, and thus have become a major con-
cern of health authorities in these countries. China is one of those countries 
undergoing market transition, although it remains a socialist state, at least 
in name. While its market reform has been largely successful and com-
mendable in other sectors, its market-based health reform has been pre-
dominantly a failure acknowledged even by the authorities (Ge and Gong 
2007). A main adverse outcome of the health reform is the prevalence of 
informal economies, of which informal payment is a major component. 






















contain the practice. Apart from resorting to a hierarchical regulatory 
structure, it has made even greater efforts to establish a market model to 
lift the efficiency of healthcare and the morale of health  professionals, and 
has introduced some particular market-based mechanisms to curb infor-
mal economies. But the result is apparently not satisfactory.
This chapter aims to evaluate the governance of informal payments 
through market mechanisms in the Chinese healthcare system, analyzing 
why the market is unlikely to be a feasible solution to the problem.
Informal payments, which are called red packets (hongbao) in Chinese, 
emerged in the late 1980s, and have since become increasingly widespread. 
Today, the practice of giving red packets to doctors has become a deep-
rooted social norm for hospitalized patients. An investigation conducted 
between 2008 and 2009 in ten cities surveyed 4,000 patients who had been 
hospitalized in recent years. The results showed that 54.4 % of them gave red 
packets to doctors (Kong et al. 2011). Almost everyone who received opera-
tions gave red packets to their surgeons. Only 4.7 % of patients gave their red 
packets as a token of gratitude. Over 95 % of them were motivated for reasons 
other than gratitude. The study thus concluded that giving red packets had 
become a “latent norm” and “a rule of the profession”, although 73.5 % of 
patients believed it was not right for doctors to take red packets from them. 
Other studies also confirm that informal payment has been so ubiquitous 
that it has become a social norm (Bork et al. 2011; Eggleston and Yip 2004; 
Hong 2012; Huang 2004; Lu et al. 2010; Zhou and Zhang 2004).
Given the prevalence of informal payments and other forms of miscon-
duct in the healthcare system, there is little wonder the government has 
been under constant criticism for not doing enough, in spite of the fact 
that it has always taken a firm stance against misconduct and has made tre-
mendous governance efforts to contain this in the healthcare system since 
the early 1990s. Generally speaking, two models of governance have been 
employed. One is usually termed as “government” in which the power 
and control is hierarchically exercised from the top down (Kjær 2004). 
The other is the market, in which the governance of informal payments is 
exercised through market-based mechanisms. Accordingly, criticisms have 
concentrated on two aspects: hierarchical regulation and marketization.
In terms of hierarchical governance, scholars almost unanimously call 
for the government to step up its efforts to strengthen regulatory and 
supervisory devices and institutions to control informal economies in hos-
pitals. But, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Yang 2015), the criticism is 
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in tremendous efforts, mobilized considerable resources from both the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government and established 
complicated and omnipresent hierarchical governing structures to regu-
late and redress medical misconduct. The problems which have led to the 
poor performance and outcomes of the party-state’s regulation lie less in 
its regulatory efforts than in the flaws in the institutional design of the 
hierarchical governance.
Throughout the reform era, however, the Chinese government and 
health authority, aligning health reform with the market-oriented eco-
nomic reform that has dominated the transition inaugurated in the late 
1970s, have favored market more than hierarchy as a governance solu-
tion to informal economies in the healthcare system. As Wang Shaoguang 
notes, the Chinese government has a superstitious belief in the almighty 
power of economic growth and the market, embracing them as the elixir 
for social and political problems (Wang 2003). But scholars are divided on 
whether the market is a culprit or a solution for informal payments. One 
opinion blames marketization for some endemic problems that haunt the 
Chinese healthcare system today. Blumenthal and Hsiao (2015), critics 
of healthcare marketization in China, note that since 1984, the Chinese 
healthcare system has undergone three major stages of reform. During the 
stage between 1984 and 2003, the healthcare system experienced drastic 
free market reforms featuring the retreat of the state from financing public 
health insurance and facilities, decentralization and privatization, leading 
to widespread public outcries and discontent. From 2003, the govern-
ment introduced some modest insurance schemes to cover rural popula-
tions and urban employees in the private sector and unemployed residents, 
but these schemes were not successful as the party-state was reluctant to 
make significant financial commitment to healthcare. In the latest, ongo-
ing round of reform starting from 2008, the government, realizing the 
drawbacks of a healthcare system based on market principles, attempted to 
abandon market-oriented incentives and commit to “providing affordable 
basic healthcare for all Chinese people by 2020” (Blumenthal and Hsiao 
2015, p. 1283). But hospitals resisted the reform efforts, forcing the gov-
ernment to continue to rely on market mechanisms.
Informal payments are believed to have emerged in the context of 
market- based health reforms. Since for-profit activities are encouraged and 
incentivized, medical professionals naturally take advantage of their domi-
nating market position in their relationship with patients and maximize 









































the state and are set at a low level, a black market has emerged in which 
doctors receive informal extra payments from patients to compensate their 
low incomes (Bork et al. 2011; Cao 2010; Chen 2006a; Xu 2006; Zhou 
and Zhang 2004). As a result, the scholars of this view advocate that the 
state must be brought back to dominate the organization and delivery 
of healthcare—only thus can problems and corruption in the system be 
solved (Ge and Gong 2007; Li 2005; Xu 2006). However, these scholars 
usually overlook the fact that the state has always been heavily involved, 
especially in the hierarchy that governs illegitimate economic behaviors 
of practitioners in public hospitals, but corruption and misconduct are 
nonetheless endemic. The theory is also weak in explaining why informal 
payments have to be transacted in a “black” market if the healthcare sys-
tem has been marketized.
The above view has been vehemently challenged by scholars who argue 
that blaming the failure of health reform on “marketization” is unwarranted, 
as no genuine market has ever been established in the healthcare system; or 
the so-called “market” has been so underdeveloped or heavily intervened in 
by the state that it can hardly be considered as a market (Fan 2010; Gu et al. 
2006; Wong 2010; Wu 2007; Chen 2006b; Zhou 2008). In spite of the 
fact that public hospitals receive barely any funding from the government 
and rely predominantly on patients’ out-of-pocket payments to survive, they 
operate in a “market” that is largely closed to private competitors and their 
market monopoly is heavily protected by the state. Scholars of this view 
believe that this closed and underdeveloped “market”, coupled with exces-
sive regulation in some areas, such as salaries of public doctors and prices for 
basic services, and insufficient regulation and supervision in other areas, such 
as pharmaceutical products and highly decentralized hospital management, 
is the origin of the problems and corruptions that haunt the healthcare sys-
tem. In other words, they do not believe that genuine marketization would 
have allowed these problems. It is the state, they argue, that is the culprit. 
As a result, they claim that a genuine, well-governed healthcare market is the 
solution to healthcare problems, including informal payments. Some schol-
ars explicitly propose competition (Fan 2010; Peng 2004; Wang and Kuai 
2008) and differential pricing (Kong 2004; Lu 2011; Wang 1998; Wang and 
Kuai 2008; Chen 2006b) as the appropriate market mechanisms to weed out 
informal payments and other misconduct in public hospitals.
Scholars of this view have demonstrated a better understanding of 
what the market is, to what extent the Chinese healthcare system has been 
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they believe is a process of pseudo-marketization. But the solutions they 
 propose may not be the right answer to the problems. Market-based com-
petition and differential pricing have long been implemented in the public 
healthcare system to boost efficiency and morale, and to fight informal 
payments. The outcomes of these methods, however, are far from satisfac-
tory. Advocates for market solutions are yet to answer why market ele-
ments have failed to produce the intended results.
It is true that the health “market” in China is excessively regulated and 
closed to private providers of medical services, and is thus highly under-
developed. Meanwhile, it is also evident that healthcare is highly commer-
cialized as the government has made great and consistent efforts since the 
mid-1980s to establish market elements in the public healthcare system 
to boost efficiency, quality and ethics, and, more importantly, to unbur-
den its financial commitment to both the population and public facilities. 
It is also evident that market mechanisms have been adopted as a major 
approach to redress informal and unhealthy behaviors and economies in 
the healthcare system, but these devices are far from successful.
Limited by space, this chapter will not probe what has given rise to 
informal payments and why the hierarchy has failed to rein in the practice, 
but will focus on why governance by the market is unlikely to be the solu-
tion. In the following text, I will evaluate two leading market mechanisms 
that have been employed to control informal payments. One is competi-
tion, the other differential pricing.
competItIon and “patIents choose doctors”
The year 2000 is crucial to market-oriented health reform thanks to the 
promulgation of several important policies. In February the State Council 
approved a guideline to deepen the reform to the urban healthcare and 
pharmaceutical systems (State Council Economic Restructuring Office 
et al. 2000), promising further opening up in both sectors and the estab-
lishment of an urban healthcare system that was more compatible with 
the socialist market economy. A major move in the reform is that pub-
lic hospitals were encouraged to implement internal competition mech-
anisms (Ministry of Health and State Bureau of Traditional Medicine 
Administration 2000). A scheme, called “patients choose doctors” (bin-
gren xuan yisheng) which was designed in light of competition principles, 
was implemented to reshape doctor–patient relationships. Through the 







































a hospital, medical employees’ attitudes and the quality and  efficiency of 
services were expected to improve significantly. It was demanded in the 
policy that all employees within a public hospital participate in competi-
tion, and that their incomes would be determined by their performance in 
competition against each other. Those who came last in the competition 
would be disqualified from their medical posts.
What doctors competed for was the patronage of or selection by 
patients. In general, patients cannot choose their doctors. If they are cov-
ered by public insurance, they are not even allowed to choose their hospi-
tals. The reason that the “patients choose doctors” scheme was promoted 
as a ground-breaking policy lies in the fact that it empowered patients, 
granting them the right and privilege to choose whatever doctors and 
nurses they liked, without additional charges. Medical employees, with 
their incomes linked to the number of patients they served, were pressured 
to improve their service quality and attitude. Otherwise they would not 
only face declining incomes, but also the threat of losing their practicing 
qualification or even unemployment (Zhao 2000, 2001a).
The health authority was not unaware that patients’ choice was limited 
by information asymmetry. To overcome the barrier to information, hos-
pitals were instructed to make easily available and accessible every single 
doctor’s qualification, professional title, specialty, photo and any other rel-
evant information to facilitate patients making their choice. Medical service 
guides were also appointed to help patients choose appropriate depart-
ments and doctors (Ministry of Health and State Bureau of Traditional 
Medicine Administration 2000). The ministry apparently believed that 
this would be sufficient for patients to exercise their power of choice.
The decree did not explicitly state that the scheme was intended to 
target informal payments, but an anti-corruption purpose was doubtlessly 
embedded in it. As doctors had to curry favor from patients to survive, 
they would not dare to take, still less solicit, red packets. Based on this 
assumption, the government has also attached more importance to com-
petition than to hierarchy as an efficient and enduring solution to red 
packets. In 2004, the Ministry of Health launched a country-wide cam-
paign against improper conduct. One of the major targets was informal 
payments. Although the ministry specified disciplinary punishment for 
eight examples of organizational and individual misconduct (taking red 
packets being one of the individual instances), it emphasized more con-
structive approaches toward the general ethos of the healthcare system, 
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supervision. But, more importantly, it promised further and deeper reform 
to the system by encouraging fair and orderly competition and advancing 
the “patients choose doctors” scheme (Ministry of Health 2004). The 
comments of Ma Wen, one of the leading figures in China’s disciplinary 
hierarchy,1 were more telling about the government’s preference for com-
petition. When looking back at the development of the work of control-
ling unhealthy tendencies, she noted that since 1997 the government had 
employed both constructive and rectifying approaches to strike at both the 
roots and the effects of unhealthy tendencies. “Patients choose doctors” 
was highly commended as one of the constructive methods striking at the 
roots of misconduct in the healthcare system (Ma 2008). As a result, there 
is little wonder that the scheme was considered as the right direction for 
health reform (Guo 2007).
In spite of the vehement promotion by the government, however, pub-
lic hospitals were not enthusiastic about the scheme. In 2000, the scheme 
was pushed through the entire public healthcare system. The health 
bureau of every province formed local “patients choose doctors” poli-
cies in light of the guidance of the ministerial decree, and the majority of 
public hospitals had implemented or were about to implement the scheme 
(Zhao 2001b). But in 2007, when a vice minister of health reasserted that 
the scheme remained the direction of health reform (Guo 2007), many 
public hospitals had quietly abandoned it. For example, in Nanjing, the 
scheme was vigorously promoted and implemented in all public hospitals 
in 2001, but in 2007 only two major hospitals claimed they were still run-
ning it, and in a limited form, so limited that even patients were not aware 
of its existence (Zhou and Chen 2007).
The reason the “patients choose doctors” scheme has been abandoned 
by hospitals lies in market failures, especially imperfect information and 
limited competition (Stiglitz 2000, pp. 308–310). What marks medicine 
as a profession rests on its command of a body of esoteric and scientific 
knowledge and on “its exclusive mandate to apply this knowledge to the 
care and treatment of the sick” (Daniel 1990, p. 1). Patients “must rely on 
the doctor’s judgment as to what medicine is required or whether an oper-
ation or other procedure is advisable. Because they lack medical exper-
tise, patients cannot effectively assess and evaluate their doctors’ advice” 
(Stiglitz 2000, p. 309). But the “patients choose doctors” scheme is based 
on the assumption that the former possess sufficient medical knowledge 
about their illness and are provided adequate information about the doc-









































to already know the nature of their health problems. Then by reading 
doctors’ biographical data publicized somewhere in the hospital, patients 
should be able to find the right doctors to consult. If they are still not sure 
which doctors to go to, service guides will provide sufficient information 
to assist selection. It must be noted that the Chinese healthcare system 
does not have GPs. Doctors in hospitals are all specialists in a sense. The 
service guides are usually staffed by nurses who are not qualified to pro-
vide medical advice. They only direct patients to the doctors that they 
think appropriate.
Chinese patients, however, are not smarter or more learned in medicine 
than those of other countries. In most cases, they do not know what the 
causes of their illnesses are. That is why they go to doctors to seek help. 
But, as many critics have pointed out, under the “patients choose doc-
tors” scheme, patients are supposed to first know what their problems are 
through self-diagnosis, and then go to hospitals with the knowledge of 
which doctors are able to help. In reality, patients can hardly make sound 
self-diagnosis due to lack of expertise. Even if their self-diagnosis is accu-
rate to some extent and they go to the right specialties to seek treatment, 
choosing the right doctors is another hurdle that can hardly be overcome 
by reading doctors’ information or seeking advice from service guides. In 
short, patients have knowledge of neither their illness nor their doctors 
(Liu 2000; Yuan et al. 2003; Zhang 2000). Then how do they choose?
It has been widely reported that, due to information asymmetry, many 
patients make their choice irrationally. Firstly, they choose by the looks 
of doctors, selecting the good-looking ones or those who look learned 
or friendly (Li 2001; You 2000; Yuan et al. 2003; Zhu 2002). Secondly, 
patients may check each doctor’s office first, and then choose the one 
whose office is crowded or has the longest queue (Liu 2000; Shi 2001). 
Thirdly, and far more frequently, patients choose senior doctors. This is 
the uttermost concern of both hospital management and doctors.
Public doctors have four professional ranks—doctor (yishi), responsible 
doctor (zhuzhi yishi), associate chief doctor (fu zhuren yishi), and chief 
doctor (zhuren yishi). Doctors holding the last two ranks are considered 
senior doctors, and constituted only 12.3 % of the entire medical profes-
sion in 2001 (China Health Year Book Editorial Board 2002). As patients 
usually do not have the information of the competence of each doctor, 
and are not equipped with the knowledge to distinguish the subtleties of 
doctors’ specialisms within the same department, what they trust is what 
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senior doctors are more experienced and competent than middle-rank and 
junior doctors. For the same amount or slightly higher consultation fees, 
patients flock to senior doctors (Shi 2001; You 2000; Yuan et al. 2003; 
Zhu 2002).
Hospital managements are deeply concerned about the imperfect com-
petition and its negative effects on the profession that the scheme entails. 
Firstly, it is unfair to middle-rank and junior doctors as much fewer patients 
choose them (Gao and Yang 2003; You 2000; Yuan et al. 2003). The lack 
of patronage is not because they are incompetent or the quality of their 
services is not up to standard, but solely because they are in the early or 
middle stages of their careers and patients usually do not trust young doc-
tors as much. Doctors of lower ranks thus have fewer opportunities to 
build up their medical experience and skills and prepare for higher-rank 
positions. In addition, as doctors’ salaries are determined by the number 
of patients they serve, fewer patients means less income. Lacking in oppor-
tunities to practice and decline in income may compel young doctors to 
quit their medical jobs and seek career opportunities and higher incomes 
in other sectors.
Secondly, as patients are granted the power to choose for no additional 
charge, they tend to choose senior specialists for even minor illnesses such 
as common cold (Yuan et al. 2003; Zhang and Xu 2007; Zheng 2007; 
Zhu 2002). This creates tremendous pressure and unmanageable work-
loads for senior doctors who are always in high demand. To ensure all 
patients who choose them are served in a timely order, they have to work 
longer and shorten the time spent on each patient, which inevitably leads 
to work fatigue and decline of service quality (You 2000; Zhang and Xu 
2007; Zhou and Chen 2007). For the hospital management, senior doc-
tors, especially reputed and eminent doctors, doing work that a junior or 
middle rank doctor can competently accomplish, is a complete waste of 
human resources (Zheng 2007).
More importantly, the “patients choose doctors” scheme failed to con-
tain informal payments. On the contrary, it fueled the “latent norm”. 
Information asymmetry and imperfect competition doubtlessly push up 
the demand for the services of senior doctors. Empowered patients found 
that they are actually in a seller’s market and are not that powerful. Due to 
the spiraling demand, the services of senior and particularly eminent doc-
tors become increasingly scarce. As patients are not charged additional fees 
for choosing senior specialists, they found that they still have to pay infor-









































services in order to ensure attention and quality. Only now informal pay-
ments are concentrated in the hands of senior doctors, leaving doctors 
of lower ranks losing both formal and informal incomes. This becomes a 
source of tension between senior doctors and their junior colleagues.
Given the drawbacks of the scheme, there is little wonder that hospitals 
are not enthusiastic about implementing it and many have phased it out in 
spite of the insistence of the ministry. This does not necessary indicate that 
public hospitals resist the market and are unwilling to give patients power 
of choice. On the contrary, they are keen to empower patients, but they do 
not want to give the power of choice for free. Fully aware of their monopo-
listic position in the healthcare “market” and the scarcity of senior and emi-
nent doctors, public hospitals want patients to pay for their choosing power 
and therefore prefer another market mechanism—differential pricing.
dIfferentIal prIcIng and “operatIon 
by nomInatIon”
Differential pricing has a name in the Chinese healthcare system—spe-
cial medical services (texu yiliao fuwu). It was an initiative of the health 
authority. In 1992, the Ministry of Health promulgated a decree which 
gave public hospitals the permission to offer special medical services pro-
viding that basic medical services were adequately supplied (Ministry of 
Health 1992). The purpose was to provide choice medical services to 
meet the increasing demands of well-off patients, and to break the egali-
tarian income distribution system that employees of the public healthcare 
sector had been subject to for a long time. Guided by market spirit and 
the law of value, the decree promised to decentralize the pricing power in 
special medical services, allowing the prices of such services to float or to 
be determined by the industry or hospitals themselves.
The ministerial policy was endorsed and reinforced in 1997 by a central 
government decree which launched an overall reform to the healthcare 
system in an attempt to make it more adaptive to the socialist market 
economy (Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and State 
Council 1997). Differential pricing was adopted as a key mechanism to 
motivate health organizations and personnel. The central government 
promised relaxation of the regulation of pricing on medical services for 
special voluntary needs, and clarified this promise in a decree jointly issued 
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The decree demanded the market competition mechanism was put to full 
use. The central government was no longer involved in setting prices for 
medical services, the responsibility of which was devolved to local munici-
pal governments. Municipal price bureaus were demanded to follow mar-
ket competition principles, set guidance prices in light of the categories 
of hospitals and ranks of doctors, and to relax the regulation of pricing 
of special medical services. Special medical services were embraced by the 
government as a major policy initiative to bring healthcare in line with the 
market reform that was making significant progress in other sectors.
Hospitals have been more enthusiastic about special medical services 
and embraced them eagerly since 1992 as a major source of revenue to 
compensate for the ever decreasing government funding. Special medi-
cal services is the general term for several services, including “operation 
by nomination” (dianming shoushu), “expert outpatient consultation” 
(zhuanjia menzhen), “special wards” (texu bingfang) and “special care” 
(texu huli). Expert outpatient consultation allows eminent specialists to 
charge significantly higher fees for advising outpatients. Special wards 
refer to expensive, “luxurious” wards that are usually lavishly furnished 
and better equipped, and contain fewer beds than ordinary wards. Special 
care is comprehensive full-time care provided by nurses so that relatives of 
patients do not have to stay in hospitals to provide care.
What is relevant to the current research is the scheme of “operation 
by nomination” which is explicitly designed to curb informal payments 
in the healthcare system. The scheme was first adopted by some public 
hospitals in Beijing and Shanghai in the 1980s (Shu and Wen 1993). With 
the ministerial endorsement on special medical services in 1992, it became 
a widespread “standard” service of public hospitals, especially major hos-
pitals. The scheme, which allows patients to choose senior surgeons they 
prefer by making extra payments for their preferential and prompt ser-
vices, was designed with an explicit intention to formalize informal pay-
ments (Meng and Liu 2004; Shu and Wen 1993; Yuan 1995). As patients 
were always under the pressure to give red packets to their surgeons, why 
not formalize them so that both patients and surgeons did not feel guilty 
of giving and taking (Ni 1993; Shu and Wen 1993; Ye and Liu 1993)? 
More importantly, the scheme would encourage competition among doc-
tors, especially senior doctors, as only those with excellent skills and good 
attitudes and manners would be selected by patients. To attract patients, 
surgeons were compelled to improve their skills and provide quality ser-









































Throughout the 1990s, however, the provision of the “operation 
by nomination” service was chaotic. Even right after the scheme was 
endorsed by the Ministry of Health, a vice minister of health complained 
that some hospitals turned basic medical services into special services or 
forced patients to choose their own surgeons. The scheme also caused 
confusion and conflicts in the collegial relationship among doctors and 
hampered the orderly operation of hospitals (Yin 1993).
With the devolution of pricing power to local municipal government, 
Beijing Price Bureau and Health Department took the lead in 2001 to con-
trol the chaos and to regulate special medical services. They decreed the 
abolition of three special services, namely, after-hour operations, one-on- 
one care and accompanied delivery, while retaining three special services, 
including A-class wards, operation by nomination and children’s health 
centers. Surgical operations for which patients were allowed to choose 
their own surgeons were strictly limited to difficult, complicated and seri-
ous cases, and their “special” status must be approved by the experts at 
each hospital. Only senior surgeons were qualified to provide the service. 
The maximum annual number of “operations by nomination” must not 
exceed 30 % of the total number of surgical operations of a hospital. The 
extra fees for the service that hospitals were allowed to charge were lim-
ited to 50 % of the normal fees, with a ceiling of 800 yuan per operation 
(Beijing Price Bureau and Beijing Municipal Health Department 2001).
The outcome of the regulation, however, was not satisfactory. The 
Beijing Municipal Government had to ban the scheme from public hospi-
tals entirely in 2006 (Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and 
Reform and Beijing Municipal Health Department 2006). The reasons 
that the authorities gave were that the scheme generated more concerns 
than benefits. Firstly, the scheme disrupted normal surgical arrangements 
which had been decided by categories and degrees of complexity. As in 
the case of the “patients choose doctors” scheme, information asymmetry 
induced patients to choose senior surgeons to do all types of operations, 
irrespective of degree of complexity. Although it was stipulated that only 
difficult and complicated operations were qualified for the special surgical 
service, in reality, the hospital management was inclined to yield to the 
demands of empowered patients. As a result, senior surgeons always had 
full schedules of operations, and thus had little time for ward visits, profes-
sional development and supervision of junior doctors. In the meantime, 
junior and middle-rank surgeons lost the opportunities to perform surgery 
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result. Secondly, the health authority was concerned that the scheme had 
increased the economic burden on patients. Thirdly, the scheme attracted 
patients from all over China to seek medical services in Beijing where they 
could find more medical experts than anywhere else and choose their own 
surgeons despite additional fees. The surging number of patients created 
huge pressure on Beijing’s healthcare system and prolonged the waiting 
lists of senior surgeons (Li 2006).
What the government was reluctant to admit was that the “operation 
by nomination” scheme, which had been intended to turn under-the-table 
deals above-board via market mechanisms, failed to contain informal pay-
ments. Even if patients paid formal nomination fees to the hospital, they 
still had to pay extra informally to surgeons (Li 2006; Liu 1994; Wang 
2006a; Yan 2006; Yuan 1995). The persistence of the practice under the 
scheme was contributable to patients’ distrust of the bureaucratic medical 
system. Formal nomination fees were paid to the hospital, which in turn 
paid part of the fees to surgeons formally. Patients viewed this process as 
an official arrangement and thus it did not serve the purpose of motivat-
ing doctors privately. Patients intended red packets to personalize their 
relationship with surgeons as they believed that only personalized relation-
ships could obligate public doctors. The distrust drove savvy patients to 
continue to offer red packets even if they had paid additional fees formally 
for the special service. Moreover, the nomination rates were capped, and 
only a small share went to surgeons. Surgeons did not feel particularly 
incentivized, and their incomes did not increase significantly (Li 2006; 
Wang 2006b). It was reported that on hearing surgeons only took 30–50 
% of nomination fees, some patients felt unsettled and voluntarily offered 
red packets in private to compensate for the surgeons’ loss. Consequently, 
despite the scheme to formalize red packets, informal payments had never 
disappeared (Yang and Ding 2006; Yuan 1995; Zhang 2006).
A significant change in healthcare ideology also contributed to its fall-
ing into disfavor with the government. Unlike “patients choose doctors” 
which demanded doctors serve patients better and equally, differential 
pricing, with its emphasis on profit, encouraged hospitals to discrimi-
nate against patients and provide unequal services accordingly. This mar-
ket rationale is incongruent with the CCP’s ideological commitment to 
“serving the people” (Yang 2009). Since 2005 when the failure of health 
reform was openly admitted and blamed on marketization, the govern-
ment gradually shifted the kernel of its healthcare ideology from market- 









































announced in 2009 distinguished itself from previous reforms with its 
emphasis on the non-profit nature of public medicine and health, and 
on its mission to promote equity and fairness (Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party and State Council 2009). This may explain why 
the “patients choose doctors” scheme is continuously promoted while the 
“operation by nomination” scheme was abandoned.
Although the government banned the “operation by nomination” 
scheme, it did not abolish all special services based on the differential pric-
ing principle. Special services have always been a major source of revenues 
to compensate for insufficient government funding. As the government 
is unable to increase investment significantly to cover the operational loss 
of public hospitals, it has to allow them to continue to provide special 
services for the sake of generating revenues and balancing the accounts. 
In the 2009 reform plan and the latest 2015 reform plan, public hospi-
tals are allowed to keep no more than 10 % of wards for special services 
(Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and State Council 
2009; General Office of the State Council 2015), which has been inter-
preted as the government’s reluctant concession to hospitals’ demands for 
profit and their preference for differential pricing (Cao 2015; Chen and 
Du 2010; Du 2010).
“Operation by nomination” as an independent category of special ser-
vice is no longer offered in hospital, but it has been combined into other 
types of special services, especially the “special wards” service, and has sur-
vived until today. “Special wards” is a euphemism for “luxurious wards” or 
“VIP wards”. They are usually spacious and decorated like five-star hotel 
rooms. More importantly, special wards are staffed by senior and eminent 
specialists and the most competent nurses of a hospital, and equipped with 
the most sophisticated medical technology. Of course, the prices of such 
wards are remarkably higher than ordinary wards. For example, in 2014, 
a major public hospital in Guangzhou set up a “five-star delivery service” 
which offered special wards for about 3000 yuan per day (in comparison, 
ordinary delivery wards cost about 100 yuan). Would-be mothers hospital-
ized into special wards could not only enjoy luxurious accommodation and 
hotel style services, but also pick any obstetricians and nurses as they liked 
(Yuan 2014). “Special wards” services in public hospitals have been widely 
and vehemently criticized for encroaching on public resources, making 
senior doctors less available to ordinary patients and exacerbating health 
inequality (Bai 2015; He and Jin 2015); but in the foreseeable future, 
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conclusIon
Competition and differential pricing are policy initiatives that demonstrate 
the government’s determination to follow market principles to combat 
informal payments in the healthcare system, but they suffered different 
fates. The health authority apparently favors competition and the “patients 
choose doctors” scheme as it ideally combines market mechanisms and the 
CCP’s ideological commitment to equity. But the scheme is not attractive 
to hospitals. What hospitals are enthusiastic about is differential pricing and 
“special services” which are more efficient in generating profits. As differen-
tial pricing worsens health inequality, however, it has been increasingly dis-
favored by the CCP, which has been reasserting its devotion to the socialist 
principle of social justice and equality in healthcare in recent years.
More importantly, the schemes, which were intended to govern informal 
economic activities by market mechanisms, failed to contain red packets. Both 
schemes grant choosing power to patients, who are supposed to exercise it 
rationally in selecting doctors and thus encourage competition and improve-
ment of service quality. But market failures hinder their choice. Due to infor-
mation asymmetry and imperfect competition, patients usually surrender their 
choosing power to senior and eminent doctors. Their “irrational” choice only 
reinforces the professional power and market position of the latter. In other 
words, these market mechanisms unintentionally push up the demand for 
senior and eminent doctors, especially eminent surgeons, and exacerbate the 
scarcity of their services. To compete for their services, patients still have to 
offer red packets. Senior and eminent doctors thus benefit both formally and 
informally from market mechanisms to the detriment of the interests of both 
their patients and colleagues of middle and junior ranks. As a result, market 
mechanisms do not solve or even abate the problem of informal payments, 
but just concentrate them in the hands of elite doctors.
It is evident that the market-oriented reform has not established a gen-
uine market for medical services, and therefore it is unfair to blame the 
prevalence of red packets and other profit-driven misconduct on marketi-
zation. Meanwhile, it is still too early to assume that a genuine market 
would solve the problems of unhealthy tendencies. Health policymakers 
in China have overwhelmingly focused on reform to health insurances and 
public health organizations. Little attention has been paid to the gover-
nance of doctors as a profession. Perhaps it is time for the Chinese govern-
ment to shift its policy focus. At the end of the day, it is doctors who serve 









































 1. Ma Wen was the Vice Secretary of the Central Committee of Disciplinary 
Inspection, Minister of Supervision, and Director of the State Council 
Office of Rectifying Unhealthy tendencies, all of which were the top disci-
plinary organs of the party-state.
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